To describe a state flow in situational theory of conflict we propose a model that combines the theory of Markov chains and game theory as a finite-state machine. To calculation of normalized payoff we used conjugate Markov chain whose states are the possible players winnings. As an example the rancher problem and the gardener problem as semideterministic automata of Bayes type are considered.
Introduction
The classical theory of finite-state automata [1] supposes its work with the deterministic meaning of the input signal. I.e. for any input symbol, there exists a unique state of the next transition. In other words, deterministic finite-state automata given as quintuple A = (s, x, y, f, g), where s is a finite set of states; (x, y) is the input and output alphabet, respectively; f is the state-transition function; g is the output function. A natural generalization of deterministic finite-state machine is to be used of random variables as its arguments. For example, in [2] Rabin introduced nondeterministic automata, in which the transition function f was defined by a stochastic matrix. In [3] Probabilistic characteristics of the machine arise in cases when one from two players is the nature. Then the human response strategies can be calculated using, for example, the Bayesian criterion. This machine we will call a Bayesian automaton. In paper [3] with help of this machine the concrete situation of crash of the flood dam during floods on the Amur River in 2013 was simulated. In [4] this scheme for situational simulation of the Zeya hydroelectric power station in extreme situations was used. In those articles the system had 3 and 5 states respectively. Since the authors did not find an analytical solution of tasks in this connection was used StateFlow simulation methods of Simulink Matlab package.
In this work we give a calculation technique of analytical solutions for automata of small dimension and suggest several examples for their application.
Preliminary notes about state automaton
Consider steps of analytical solution of Bayesian automata A = (s 0 , s 1 ),
x 00 x 01 x 10 x 11 , y 00 y 01 y 10 y 11 , f, g .
.
2) For a given probability of arrival of input signal b k from Bayesian criterion we find an optimal strategies for all games a * k :
Obviously, they do not necessarily coincide.
3) The product a * k b m generates an input (i.e. argument function f ) which determines the change in a system state at the next step
Because our machine has 2 states, the set of all possible transition f form a logical function of 2 · 2 2 = 8 variables (i.e. total N = 2 8 = 256 automata). However, since the Nash theorem asserts that any finite game has a solution in pure or mixed strategies, the number of different Bayesian machine is reduced by half.
Furthermore, we can select the equivalent machines. I.e. machines, which have the same limit states and the average winnings of players. Consider an automaton Here, with help of bold lines we have selected the optimal Bayesian strategies. Further, to simplify, we introduce the following notation. We write transition function of the automaton in one line
and convert it to hexadecimal.
Consider the automaton 55 h It is easy to see that the machines 3d h and 55 h are equivalent. These machines have equal optimal strategies and therefore the same limit state and the average winnings.
All equivalent machines split the entire set into 7 groups Here, with help of underline font a leaders of the equivalence classes for which we can obtain exact analytical solutions were marked. Solutions for the remaining machines can be obtained by simply replacing of component of the payoff matrix.
The rancher problem
Before we present the table of analytical solutions for considered automata we show a calculating technique for limit states and average wins on the practical example.
Every morning, the farmer collects cucumbers and decides: to pour his own rancho a 1 or not a 0 . Rain can go with probability b 1 = 0.4 and watering his rancho also. Depending on watering day the rancho takes one of two states: S 0 good, or S 1 bad. I.e. depending on the input signal a i b j , the state of rancho varies according to the transition function
Depending on the state of rancho the farmer has payoff matrix
In other words, this automaton has the following output function g
Now we find optimal strategy of farmer with help the Bayes criterion
For this, it is necessary to calculate the average win of farmer if he uses strategy a 0 or a 1 . For S 0 state:
For S 1 state:
I.e. for both state the optimal strategy of farmer is a 0 : do not watering own rancho. We have automaton 88 h -type for which StateFlow diagram has the form S0 S1 and define the player's payoff on first step as
The player's payoff on second step is
Further,
It follows that normalized player's payoff for our automaton is
Substituting the initial values we obtain
Analytical solutions for (1)-automata
Next, we assume that zero strategies are optimal from the Bayes criterion. This implies that average wins for leaders of equivalence classes are
-type had been studied. In this section we consider steps of analytical solution of Bayesian automata then payment matrix are:
Because our machine has 3 states, the set of all possible transition f form a logical function of 3 · 3 · 2 = 18 variables (i.e. total N = 3 18 = 387 420 489 automata).
To determine the normalized average payoff we construct the conjugate Markov chain. Let the payoff matrix allow following vector of optimal strategies I.e. components of the payoff matrix corresponding optimal strategies. Hence the weight of the transition edge l(S i , S k ) is probability that Player will obtain profit c 
The gardener problem: simple
The gardener problem in own classic formulation [6] suggests the presence of two stochastic transition matrix (q 0 ij , q 1 ij ), i, j = 1, 2, 3. Each matrix corresponds to one of two gardener strategies about choice of method of care for own garden.
By two stochastic matrix corresponds to the payoff matrix (p 0 ij , p 1 ij ), for which the gardener determines own winnings at the next step. As can be seen from the statement of the problem the garden itself and randomly changes own state. In this work we describe this system in the form of semideterministic finite state machine game type. I.e. we assume that changeover of the garden state do not happen by themselves, but under an influence of external signalfactor (invasion of any parasites or onset of abnormal weather condition). Obviously, the pre-predict the occurrence of such effects are impossible, as there are only the probability of their occurrence.
Therefore we consider the case where Markov transition matrix q is constant for any state of the garden and depend only on the gardener strategies (a 0 , a 1 ):
Then the transition function of automaton has the form
According to the presented functions the gardener has two strategies: a 0 -spray the garden; It is evident that vector of optimal strategies are For the further analysis of this game we define variables
and the average win on the first step
To determine the normalized average payoff we construct conjugate Markov chain. This Markov chain has the following state vector s = (c k , d k , e k ). The components of this vector are components of the payoff matrix, which corresponds to the optimal strategies. Then the weight of the edge l(S i , S k ) is the probability of obtaining by player of win h k provided that in the previous step he profited h i . The conjugate Markov transition matrix is 
and has the limit statē
Then normalized average win for this automaton has the form
Let b 0 = 0.7, b 1 = 0.2, then µ = (9.6; 8.6; 4.6), f = 9.369.
The gardener problem: extended
The fundamental difference of our system from [6] is that we have two transition matrix and three payoff matrix. Two transition matrices depends on two player strategies. Three payment matrix depend on three system states.
In classical formulation the transition matrix (q 0 ij , q 1 ij ) depends on the selected gardener strategy (a 0 , a 1 ). In our examples the payment matrix depends only on the state of system but not on strategies. Therefore, the output function of the automaton has the form . Determining the optimal strategy using the Bayesian criterion Suppose, as in the previous case, the vector selecting optimal strategies has the form (a * (S 0 ), a * (S 1 ), a * (S 2 )) = (a 1 , a 0 , a 0 ). Then the transition matrix for conjugate Markov chain 
where µ 0 = q 
Conclusions
In this paper, a complete classification of Bayesian automata (1) was presented.
As a result, we received 7 non-equivalent machines. Notice that if graph of automaton has branched structure then to get an exact solution is not always possible. Therefore, the analysis of specific models should be carried out by methods of situational modeling [3, 4] . If the model has an exact solution (as (3)) then its analysis is a simple substitution of the payoff matrix components into analytical expressions (as (4)). In this paper the computational technique for some simple machines was suggested. In unlike [5] to calculate the normalized wins was used a conjugate Markov chain for which states was the components of the payoff matrix of the man-nature game. It was shown that some of the problems of analysis of interaction of human with nature can be described as semideterministic automaton Bayesian type.
